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Conventional thinking about competition policy, whether in developed or emerging economies, 
focuses largely on harm to consumers and to market dynamics resulting from the abuse of seller 
power. In his prize-winning book, Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer Power: A 
Global Issue,1 Professor Peter Carstensen of Wisconsin Law School, challenges this thinking 
and offers the more provocative view that the oft-ignored abuse of buyer power poses at least 
as grave a threat to the competitive process as the abuse of seller power. He argues in fact that 
the exercise of buyer power is more dangerous not only because it is pervasive but also because 
it is easily ignored or justified on the basis that it generates lower prices and therefore enhances 
consumer welfare. 
 
Professor Carstensen’s interest in buyer power is not new. In more than forty years as an antirust 
and competition scholar,2 he has explored several different facets of buyer power whilst 
focusing particularly on the role of buyer power in the decline of the American farming sector.3 
In this most recent book, Carstensen takes his inquiry into buyer power several notches higher: 
he explores the general concept of buyer power and links it with the goals of competition law 
and policy; he examines the impact on the competitive process and the reasons why it has 
remained under-explored. Finally, he suggests strategies for controlling and regulating buyer 
power. In doing so, he evaluates the unique characteristics of the buying side of the market, the 
range of responses of competition agencies, courts and scholars to buyer power emerging 
around the world and highlights the market structures and contexts in which buyer power is 
most likely to have adverse effects on the competitive process.  
 
The result is a book which not only plugs a significant gap in competition scholarship but is 
also readable and interesting. Beyond the obvious audience of competition academics and 
practitioners seeking to explore the nature of buyer power, the book is likely to be of tremendous 
interest to future scholars who are keen to arrive at a more holistic understanding of competition 
law and policy and to re-align it with its broader (and, in Carstensen’s view, more intrinsic) goal 
of safeguarding the competitive process, rather than the narrowly defined focus on consumer 
                                               
1 The book received the Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award for best antitrust book of 2017. 
https://www.cohenmilstein.com/update/recipients-honored-16th-annual-jerry-s-cohen-award-antitrust-
scholarship (accessed 12 April 2019).  
2 https://law.wisc.edu/profiles/pccarste@wisc.edu (accessed 12 April 2019). 
3 See for instance, Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Concentration and the Destruction of Competition in Agricultural 
Markets: The Case for Change in Public Policy’, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 531(2000). Other articles dealing with buyer 
power include, Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an 
Important Issue’, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 775 (2012); and Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Buyer Cartels versus Buying Groups: 
Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’, 1 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 1(2010). 
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welfare. It is a ground-breaking, authoritative text that cannot be recommended highly enough 
for inclusion in any competition law library.  
Professor Carstensen’s exploration of buyer power spans nine compact chapters: chapter 1 sets 
out the scope of the challenge that buyer power poses to conventional competition policy; 
chapter two locates buyer power within the goals of competition policy; chapter three defines 
buyer power and identifies tools for its measurement particularly in input markets and retail of 
branded goods; chapter four discusses potential harms of the existence and abuse of buyer 
power; chapter five evaluates the adequacy of competition policy for addressing unilateral 
conduct by buyers; chapter six examines market regulation and other strategies to remedy the 
abuse of buyer power; chapter seven analyses competition policy for buyer cartels and buying 
groups; chapter eight examines the possibility of controlling the creation of buyer power 
through merger policy; chapter nine concludes.  
 
At the very outset Carstensen clarifies that the risks of buyer power are not limited to markets 
in which there are many producers and few buyers but in fact exist in any buying market in 
which a buyer exercises substantial power. These may be agricultural markets, in which large 
domestic or multinational food processing companies buy directly from farmers, or retail 
markets in which large outlets purchase from manufacturers of branded goods. Although he 
cites several examples of buyers exercising power in the retail sector Carstensen is of the view 
that the most harmful exercise of such power occurs in the grocery retail sector: the rapid 
expansion of grocery supermarkets combined with significant mergers may have created two 
or three choices for consumers but on the buying side, these have resulted in highly 
concentrated markets, which allow buyers to exercise considerable power over their suppliers.  
 
More than the prevalence of buyer power, Carstensen is concerned with the harm it causes. For 
instance, he argues that increasing concentration in the grocery retail sector in America (and 
indeed worldwide) allows retailers to demand and obtain lower prices from processers, who in 
turn drive down the prices they pay for farm inputs. This leads to farmers getting less and less 
of the food dollar and the overall decline of farm incomes worldwide. He notes that a similar 
downward trend is observed beyond the agricultural sector when even profitable employers 
drive down the wages of their employees in order to offer greater discounts to the powerful 
buyers they supply. This effect is magnified in the case of developing countries, where global 
buyers use their power to drive down prices to the point that employers are unable to pay 
adequate wages or invest in a safe working environment.  
 
According to Carstensen, buyer power is damaging not only for the harm it causes to 
individuals but also for the long-term havoc it wreaks on entire communities. He argues that to 
the extent exercise of buyer power leads producers to be undercompensated, it reduces their 
ability to participate in the economy. He also debunks the argument that this leads to lower 
prices for consumers arguing that benefit to consumers only follows if the buyer reduces the 
prices of its output. He further argues that the transfer of wealth from the producer/supplier to 
the buyer, leads to society suffering a net loss due to one sector (producers) receiving less than 
its reasonable share of compensation for the value it creates.  This harm is even more 
aggravated in an international setting where the loss is suffered by the exporting economy 
which is too remote to participate in any benefit that might accrue to the abusive buyer, its 
employees and customers.  
 
After establishing that the exercise of buyer power causes harm to competitive process by the 
exploitation and exclusion of producers, Carstensen evaluates the existing and potential 
competition policies to evaluate their adequacy for addressing abusive unilateral conduct by 
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dominant buyers. He recognises, however, that defining standards for judging such conduct 
and prescribing remedies for it is problematic and poses a considerable challenge not only to 
the conceptual framework of competition law and policy but also to its institutional framework. 
He is of the view that it may be easier to prevent the creation of buyer power rather than to 
regulate it after it has come into existence and therefore, recommends that competition policy 
analysis should evaluate the potential for direct remedies that focus as much on increasing the 
potential for entry into the buying side of the market as on protecting producers from undue 
exploitation.  
 
Carstensen makes a convincing case for addressing buyer power in devising competition policy 
by anchoring it firmly in competition policy and its primary goal of preserving the competitive 
process. He dispels the view that risks of buyer power are limited to contexts in which there 
are many producers and only one or a few buyers and establishes through painstaking analysis 
that the risks of buyer power are likely to exist in any buying market in which a buyer has 
substantial power.4 Most importantly, he underscores the transnational significance of buyer 
power: the existence and abuse of buyer power often reach across countries so that harms 
occurring in one nation have their origin in another.   
 
Whilst he documents the growing public awareness regarding the harm buyer power causes to 
the competitive process and catalogues regulatory responses in competition regimes as diverse 
as EU, US, Japan, Korea and China he emphasizes that buyer power is not easily corrected by 
market processes alone. He warns that conduct-oriented rules based on conventional 
competition policy are likely to be of only limited utility in ameliorating the harms arising from 
abuse of buyer power and detailed regulation of buyer conduct can itself become a threat to the 
critical dynamics of the competitive process. In his view, robust, consistent and globally 
comprehensive enforcement policies with respect to mergers and buying groups are the best 
way to create and sustain a workably competitive buying market.   
 
 
 
                                               
4 Defining buyer power to include not only monopsony but also bargaining power is now increasingly recognised. 
For its application in the EU context, see Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui Buyer Power in EU Competition Law (c) 
Institute of Competition Law, 2017. 
 
 
